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In this three-part series, Brazilian journalist Paulo R. Schilling describes the historical development
of his country's huge foreign debt burden, major beneficiaries and losers in the process of
accumulating the largest foreign debt in the world, and the pros and cons of certain "solutions" to
the debt crisis. The second part is a discussion of debt composition, i.e., what proportion of Brazil's
current $110 billion debt was actually spent by the public and private sectors, and the nature of
investments made with foreign loans. In early 1985, when the Brazilian debt totaled $104 billion, a
Chamber of Deputies investigative committee prepared a report on "debt composition."
The committee's estimates indicated that 40% of the debt was "financial," i.e., money borrowed
before 1982 to make interest payments. Heavy borrowing to make interest payments, of course, was
the outcome of spiralling interest rate charges. Until 1960, interest rates on long-term foreign loans
was about 2% per annum.
By 1976, the US prime rate had climbed to 6.25%, and then peaked at 21.5% in 1981-82. The
congressional committee emphasized that Brazil was effectively paying interest on $40 billion
borrowed to make previous interest payments. In brief, said the committee, this $40 billion of the
total debt never entered the country for investments in whatever projects.
Next, committee members focused on the remaining $64 billion of the total debt. According to
the March 1986 issue of Morgan Guaranty Trust's monthly bulletin, "13.2% of Brazil's $106 billion
foreign debt, or some $14 billion" were never deposited in the Central Bank. Morgan Guaranty
described this phenomenon as "currency evasion," a euphemism for misappropriation of funds.
Meanwhile, Central Bank official Luis Paulo Giao told a reporter for the O ESTADO DE SAO
PAULO that the bank had estimated misappropriation of funds in the amount of $18 billion.
Brazilian officials and politicians say most of the missing cash probably ended up in unmarked
Swiss bank accounts, or in the Grand Caymans. Assuming that Giao's estimates of misappropriation
were reasonably accurate, no more than $46 billion of the total foreign debt in 1985 actually entered
the country.
Next, Central Bank statistics show that some $16 billion in loans were contracted under Law 4,131,
a special facility which channeled credits to transnationals with subsidiaries in Brazil. The Brazilian
government is now responsible for making payments on 75% of the loan monies contracted via
Law 4,131. Thus, no more than $32 billion of the total debt were spent by the national and state
governments, and the national private business sector.
Since 1984 loan sources have virtually dried up, but the Brazilian foreign debt continued to grow. For
instance, in 1986, total foreign debt increased from $105.5 billion to $110 billion. A large portion of
the debt increment last year resulted from the devaluation of the US dollar. As the value of the yen,
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mark, pound, franc, and other strong currencies increased vis-a-vis the dollar, so too, did Brazilian
indebtedness on loan contracts with Japanese, German, British and French banks. Notes on DebtFinanced Projects Under Brazil's military rulers, the lion's share of foreign loan monies was invested
in large-scale infrastructure projects, such as the 12.6 million kilowatt Itaipu hydroelectric power
station. Itaipu was constructed on the Parana River, in a joint venture with Paraguay.
Many Brazilian politicians describe this and other massive projects as exercises in cost overruns,
contractor boondoggles, and government inefficiency and corruption. According to the original cost
estimates prepared in 1974, Itaipu would be built for a total of $2.5 billion. Since then, cost estimates
were continually revised upward to the current figure of $25 billion. Next, critics claim that the
generals' infrastructure projects were often little more than direct subsidies for big business, both
national and foreign. An example here is the eight million kilowatt Tucurui hydroelectric station in
the Amazon region.
Financed via foreign loans contracted by the national government, Tucuri was constructed largely
to supply cheap electricity for aluminum companies. In June 1986 Mines and Energy Minister
Aureliano Chaves told the FOLHA DE SAO PAULO that electricity generated by Tucurui costs
$38 per megawatt. Meanwhile, Albras a consortium of the state-run Valle do Rio Doce energy
company, and Japanese aluminum companies was paying only $10.50 per megawatt. Alumar
another consortium made up of Alcoa, Shell, and the private Brazilian firm, Camargo Correa , paid
$16.50 per megawatt.
Thus, construction costs for Tucurui are being paid by all Brazilians in the form of stagnant or
declining living standards as the government struggles to make interest payments on the foreign
debt. Brazilian taxpayers are also picking up the tab for operating Tucuri, since its two major
customers purchase electricity at 27.6% and 43.4% below cost, respectively. [Part 1 of the series was
published in the 03/17/87 issue of NotiSur. The third and final part will appear in the 03/24/87 issue.]
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